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Abstract 
Bolivia has suffered from a series of investment constraints and negative productivity 
cycles in the last half-century. In this context, this article first presents suggestive 
empirical evidence that physical capital accumulation has been constrained by high 
volatility in investment per worker, low marginal product of capital, and high adjustment 
costs. Next, the article presents evidence about the cyclical behavior of Bolivia’s total 
factor productivity (TFP) during the 1980-2008 period. As expected, the cyclical 
dynamics of TFP are shaped by cyclical variables such as terms of trade and fluctuations 
in the real exchange. However, economic policy variables (such as macroeconomic 
stabilization and external debt management), institutional variables (such as democracy 
and civil rights) and initial conditions also appear to be significant when explaining the 
behavior of Bolivia’s TFP.  
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Restricciones a la Inversión y 
 Ciclos de Productividad en Bolivia 
 
 
 
 
Resumen 
Bolivia ha sufrido una serie de restricciones a la inversión y ciclos negativos de 
productividad en el último medio siglo. En este contexto, este artículo primero presenta 
evidencia empírica que sugiere que la acumulación de capital físico ha sido restringida 
por la alta volatilidad de la inversión por trabajador, el bajo producto marginal del capital, 
y los altos costos de ajuste de la inversión. Seguidamente, el artículo presenta evidencia 
empírica sobre el comportamiento cíclico de la productividad total de factores (PTF) 
durante el periodo 1980-2008. Como se esperaba, la dinámica cíclica de la PTF ha sido 
afectada por variables cíclicas como ser las fluctuaciones en los términos de intercambio 
y el tipo de cambio real. Sin embargo, variables de política económica (como la 
estabilización macroeconómica y la administración de la deuda externa), variables 
institucionales (como la democracia y los derechos civiles), y las condiciones iniciales 
son también significativas al momento de explicar el comportamiento de la PTF en 
Bolivia. 
 
Clasificación JEL: O40, O47  
 
Palabras clave: inversión, productividad, acumulación de capital, Bolivia. 
 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
It is well known that physical capital accumulation and productivity 
improvements are two of the most proximate determinants of economic growth. In this 
context, much of the current research in development economics has to do with the 
underlying sources of capital accumulation and productivity growth. Figure 1 shows the 
behavior of physical capital accumulation and one of its underlying sources: investment. 
This figure suggests that physical capital accumulation appears to be constrained by 
largely unstable changes in investment. Figure 2 shows the behavior of the other 
proximate determinant of economic growth: total factor productivity (TFP). The figure 
emphasizes that—even in levels—productivity shows a clear cyclical behavior. 
 
Figure 1. Capital Accumulation and Investment per worker 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Extended Penn World Tables V. 4.0 (Marquetti, 2011) 
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Figure 2. Level of Total Factor Productivity 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Extended Penn World Tables V. 4.0 (Marquetti, 2011) 
 
Given these empirical regularities, this article aims to provide the beginning of an 
answer to the following two questions: 
  
1. What factors can help explain the capital accumulation constrains in Bolivia?  
2. What factors can help explain the cyclical behavior of total factor productivity in 
Bolivia?  
 
To answer these questions, this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
an econometric model of investment based on the accelerator principle and the role of 
adjustment costs. It also discusses some recent evidence on the low return to capital 
accumulation in Bolivia. Section 3 presents an econometric model that organizes the 
determinants of TFP into four categories: cyclical variables, macroeconomic policies, 
institutions, and initial conditions. Finally, Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.  
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2. The Constraints of Investment 
2.1. Some Stylized Facts: Volatility and Low Returns 
An initial observation of investment data let us identify the volatility of aggregate 
investment and historical events where investment was booming. Figure 3 shows that in 
the beginning of the 1973-1984 period, investment grew rapidly. This increase is largely 
due to the international capital inflows that were associated with the oil shocks. In the 
second half of the 1985-2002 period, investment spiked again. This time, investment 
growth was led by a large privatization program that Bolivia implemented.  
 
Figure 3. Aggregate Investment in Bolivia 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Penn World Tables V. 7.0  
 
Figure 4 shows that the long-run average of the investment share in Bolivia has 
been around 13 percent. In the privatization period, investment share raised to 19.12 
percent driven, which was in turn largely driven by a large increase Foreign Direct 
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Investment (FDI). From an international perspective, the average share of investment in 
Bolivia is low, especially when compared with fast growing economies in Asia.  
 
Figure 4. Total Investment and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Share in Bolivia 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Penn World Tables V. 7.0 and Word Development 
Indicators 2011 
Are there low returns to capital accumulation in Bolivia? 
Theoretically, capital accumulation can be low because the marginal product of 
capital (MPK) is low. More intuitively, if the real return of investment is low, investors 
do not have incentives to invest. Motivated by this argument, Caselli and Feyrer (2007) 
present different estimates of the MPK for a large sample of countries. In their approach, 
the MPK can be recovered using data on total GDP, the value of the aggregate capital 
stock, and the share of physical capital income in total GDP.  
The model starts with a Cobb-Douglas production function featuring constant 
returns to scale and a competitive capital market. Under these two assumptions, the rental 
price of capital (𝑃") equals the marginal product of capital (MPK) in equilibrium, so that  
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 𝑃" = 𝑀𝑃𝐾 ≡ 𝛼 𝑌𝐾, (1) 
   
where 𝑌 is output (e.g., total GDP), 𝐾 is the value of the stock of physical capital, and 𝛼 is the elasticity of output with respect to capital, or equivantely—given the previous 
two assumptions—the share of national income that accrues to physical capital. In this 
equilibrium, a lower MPK could be driven by a lower capital share, a lower output-capital 
ratio, or both.  
Using commonly reported estimates of 𝛼 , Caselli and Feyrer (2007) find that 
the MPK in the developing countries sample is more than double the size of that in 
developed countries sample. However, these differences disappear when land and other 
natural capital inputs are removed from the estimation of capital. By using a new World 
Bank’s dataset, Caselli (2007) separates natural capital from reproducible capital and 
suggests that many developing countries actually show lower marginal returns to 
reproducible capital accumulation.  
Based on the measurement approach of Caselli and Feyrer (2007), Table 1 
presents the results for Bolivia in a comparative perspective with other developing and 
developed countries. Compared with other developing countries, Bolivia has a lower 
marginal return to capital accumulation. Moreover, the main factor that appears to be 
driving this result is its relatively low share of reproducible capital.  
 
Table 1. A Comparative Perspective of the Marginal Product of Capital (MPK) 
 𝛼*+,-.   𝛼/012+34567.0   𝑀𝑃𝐾*+,-.   𝑀𝑃𝐾/012+34567.0   
Bolivia  0.33  0.08  0.31  0.19  
Chile  0.41  0.16  0.26  0.24  
Peru  0.44  0.22  0.20  0.18  
Botswana  0.55  0.33  0.36  0.24  
Singapore  0.47  0.38  0.15  0.18  
Japan  0.32  0.26  0.09  0.10  
USA  0.26  0.18  0.12  0.14  
 
Source: Data from Caselli and Feyrer (2007) 
 
Caselli and Feyrer (2007) also provide estimates of the MPK in the context of a 
multi-sector model. The main advantage of this setting is that it is possible to identify the 
effect of relative prices on the MPK. In the Bolivian case, as in many other developing 
countries, the marginal return to capital is even lower because the price of capital inputs 
is relatively higher that of the final output.  
 
2. Modeling Investment: The Accelerator Principle with Adjustment 
Costs 
In the macroeconomics literature, the basic notion of the accelerator principle has 
to do with changes in aggregate output that lead to changes in demand for capital goods 
and, hence, lead to an acceleration in investment plans. Pigou (1929) and Harrod (1936), 
among the earliest proponents of this theory, emphasize the role of this principle in 
explaining aggregate fluctuations in economic activity. Chenery (1952) and (1954)  
provided further extensions to the theory, and in more recent years, a series of empirical 
studies have focused on comparing its predictions with those of other models of 
investment. For instance, seminal work of Kopcke and Brauman (2001), highlights the 
good properties of the model and its relevance for relatively accurate forecasts of 
economic activity. These authors go further, and argue that even more modern 
macroeconomics employ some variant of the acceleration principle to explain aggregate 
investment.  
From a modeling perspective, the notion of the accelerator principle is that there 
is some optimal relationship between aggregate capital stock of the economy and GDP. 
In its simplest form,  
 
𝐾,∗ = 𝜇𝑌, (2) 
 
where 𝐾∗ is the optimal capital stock, 𝑌 is total output (e.g., real GDP), and 𝜇 is the 
capital/output ratio, which in this model is the accelerator parameter. According to 
Equation (1), when output is growing, then an increase in capital stock is required. In turn, 
this increase in the capital stock is defined as net investment:1  
                                               
1More formally, the acceleration principle can also be derived from a cost-minimizing problem. 
  𝐼;, ≡ 𝐾, − 𝐾,=> = 𝜇(𝑌, − 𝑌,=>). (3) 
 
The flexible accelerator model is a generalization of previously described model. 
Originally proposed by Koyck (1954), the flexible accelerator is based on the principle 
of gradual capital adjustment. The most appealing feature of this model is that it does not 
require the capital stock to be always optimally adjusted. It allows for lags in the 
adjustment towards the optimal level of capital. This dynamic adjustment can be written 
as:  
 
𝐼;, = 𝜆(𝐾,∗ − 𝐾,=>) = 𝜇(𝑌, − 𝑌,=>) (4) 
 
where 𝜆 denotes the partial adjustment coefficient. The key feature of this model is that 
the adjustment is not instantaneous. The speed of adjustment reflects both the uncertainty 
that firms face to make up the difference between 𝐾,=> and 𝐾 ∗, and the fact that the 
supply of capital goods is not instantaneous.  
To empirically estimate the accelerator model of investment, let us start from the 
definition of the flexible accelerator model:  
 
 
𝐼;, = 𝜆(𝐾,∗ − 𝐾,=>) (5) 
 
where 𝐼; is net investment, 𝐾 is the stock of capital, 𝐾∗ is the optimal capital stock, 
and 𝜆  is the adjustment coefficient. The basic acceleration principle 𝐾,∗ = 𝜇𝑌,  is 
introduced in Equation 5 to obtain:  
 
 
𝐼;, = 𝜆𝜇𝑌, − 𝜆𝐾,=>. (6) 
 
If by definition net investment is expressed as 𝐼;, = 𝐾, − 𝐾,=> and it is introduced into 
Equation 6 we obtain:  
 
 
𝐾, = 𝜇𝜆𝑌, + (1 − 𝜆)𝐾,=>. (7) 
 
Next, assuming a constant depreciation rate 𝛿 , one can add replacement 
investment 𝛿𝐾,=>  to both sides of Equation 7 and obtain the gross investment 
formulation:  
 
𝐼, = 𝜆𝜇𝑌, + (𝛿 − 𝜆)𝐾,=> (8) 
 
which is the theoretical basis for the following econometric models:  
 
 𝐼, = 𝛼 + 𝜆𝜇𝑌, + (𝛿 − 𝜆)𝐾,=> + 𝜖;, 		𝜖 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎) (9) 
 
 𝐼, = 𝛼 + M 𝛽6O=>PQR 𝑌,=6 + 𝛽S𝐾,=> + 𝜖,; 		𝜖 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎) (10) 
 
The most informative parameter from the models is 𝜆 , which represents the 
adjustment costs of investment in the economy. I study this parameter through the lens of 
three different regression frameworks. First, the standard framework of Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) is applied as an initial benchmark. Next, to take into account the problem 
of autocorrelation of the time series, two Generalized Least Squares (GLS) methods are 
implemented: the framework of Newey and West (1987) , and the framework of Prais and 
Winsten (1954)- Cochrane(1949). 2  Table 2 shows the estimates of the adjustment 
parameter for the two versions of the flexible accelerator model and the three estimation 
frameworks.  
The econometric results from Model l show that in the best scenario only a range 
between 21 and 28 of total gross investment is effectively transformed into physical 
capital. Moreover, from a dynamic perspective, Model 2 shows that the adjustment rate 
is slow. The implications of this flexible accelerator are important for understanding 
capital accumulation constrains. Since the adjustment factor 𝜆 captures the institutional 
environment within which demand and supply of investment interact, low values of 𝜆 
tend be associated with several institutional frictions including heavy bureaucracy and 
corruption, which are commonly cited the economic growth studies about Bolivia 
(Mendieta and Martin, 2008). 
 
                                               
2In the estimation tables this last method is refereed as PW-CO (Prais Winsten and Cochran Orcutt) 
Table 2. The Flexible Accelerator Model 
 
Dependent variable: Gross Investment  
 Model (1)  Model (2)  
 Basic  Newey-West  PW-CO  PW-CO  PW-CO  PW-CO  
Coefficient
s  
OLS  Stand. Err.  GLS  GLS  GLS  GLS  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  𝛽R = 𝜆𝜇  0.16***  0.16***  0.21***  0.20*  0.16  0.16  
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.13)  𝛽S = 𝛿 − 𝜆  -0.09**  -0.09  -0.16***  -0.17**  -0.20**  -0.21**  
 (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.10)  𝛽>     0.02  -0.01  -0.02  
    (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.15)  𝛽T      0.10  0.09  
     (0.14)  (0.15)  𝛽U       0.02  
      (0.14)  𝛼  1.1e+09***  1.1e+09***  1.4e+09**  1.5e+09**  1.5e+09**  1.6e+09**  
 (3.8e+08)  (3.8e+08)  (6.4e+08)  (6.7e+08)  (7.4e+08)  (7.9e+08)  
R2  0.63  na  0.42  0.40  0.39  0.39  
N  45  45  45  45  44  43  
Implied Adjustment     𝜇 = 1.01  𝛿V = 0.11  𝜆WR  0.16  0.16  0.21  0.20  0.16  0.16  𝜆WS  0.20  0.20  0.27  0.28  0.31  0.32  
 
Note: *** means statistical significance at1%; ** means statistical significance at 5%; and * means 
statistical significance at 10%. 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the Extended Penn World Tables V. 4.0 of Marquetti (2011). 
 
3. The Determinants of Cyclical Productivity 
3.1. Structural and Cyclical Variables 
Bolivia has suffered from noticeable large productivity cycles in the last half 
century. Economic policies that introduce or eliminate distortions affect to the economy’s 
aggregate productivity.3 Therefore, one could argue that macroeconomics policies (such 
as macroeconomic stabilization policies or fiscal management policies) and the 
institutional environment (reflected in indicators such as civil liberties and democracy) 
are structural variables that directly affect the aggregate efficiency and productivity of the 
economy.  
The fact that total factor productivity (TFP) exhibits pro-cyclical patterns also 
suggests the inclusion of variables related to the economic cycle. For example, adverse 
macroeconomic shocks (such a sharp decrease in the terms of trade of an economy) can 
lead to a reduction in output that could also affect the aggregate efficiency of the economy. 
In the economic history of Bolivia, both the terms of trade and the real exchange-rate 
overvaluation are variables that are associated with the macroeconomic cycles of Bolivia, 
therefore one may want to include them as controls variables in the empirical analysis of 
TFP.  
The specification of the TFP equation includes the following variables and their 
expected sign:  
• Cyclical variables such as the terms of trade and the degree real exchange rate 
overvaluation are expected to show a positive sign and a negative sign respectively.  
• Macroeconomic instability, measured as the inflation rate divided by one plus the 
inflation rate, is expected show a negative sign.  
• Fiscal mismanagement, measured as the accumulation of excessive external debt (over 
60 percent of GDP) by the central government, is expected to show a negative sign.  
• Institutional variables, such as civil rights and democracy, are expected to show 
positive signs  
                                               
3Using a more intuitive argument, perhaps, Harberger (1998)  considers positive variations in aggregate 
productivity as overall cost reductions that are associated with aggregate efficiency gains or technological 
changes. 
• Initial conditions, measured as the lag of TFP, are expected show a positive sign.  
Figure 5. Variables for Total Factor Productivity Analysis
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Marquetti (2011), Heston and Aten (2011), The World Bank 
(2011), and The Freedom House (2011) .  
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 Other important variables, such as technological innovation and technological 
adoption, are excluded from this simple econometric exercise. Unfortunately, relatively 
long time series for these variables are unavailable for the Bolivian case. Although this 
exclusion severely limits the generalization of the empirical results, the econometric 
exercise presented here is still relevant as a first reference of comparison for further 
studies that include new variables.  
Figure 5 depicts the evolution of previously described variables for the 1980-2008 
period. The figure shows that the recent increase in the country’s terms of trade that 
started to took place in 2003. Also, it is worth mentioning that the noticeable sharp 
fluctuations in the real exchange rate of the mid 1980s are associated with the Bolivian 
hyperinflation crisis. The management of the exchange rate played a crucial role in the 
stabilization program that brought an end to the crisis. The macroeconomic instability 
index captures the 23,000 percent inflation rate that galloped the Bolivian economy in 
1985. One of the common explanations for understanding the Bolivian hyperinflation is 
the accumulation (and monetization) of government debt. Finally, the institutional 
indexes are capturing the return to democracy of the country, which started in the 
beginning of 1980s.  
 
3.2. Modeling the Determinants of Productivity 
The determinants of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) are studied through the lens 
of an Auto-Regressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) model. Using the Generalized Least 
Squares methods of Prais and Winsten (1954), and Cochrane(1949) to control for 
autocorrelation, six regression models are estimated. Three models use the capital share 
of 0.32 to build the TFP series, and the other three use a capital share of 0.68. The 
determinants of TFP are grouped into four categories: cyclical variables, policies, 
institutions and initial conditions.  
Regression analysis is performed for the boundaries of the TFP estimates. The 
TFP’s lower bound is constructed using 0.32 as the capital-share parameter. The upper 
bound is constructed using 0.68 as capital-share parameter. This upper-lower boundary 
approach allows us to control for extreme differences in the capital share, thus it provides 
a more robust perspective of the marginal effects of the explanatory variables.  
Having TFP and exchange-rate overvaluation in the same regression can generate 
endogeneity problems due to reverse causality. It is possible to argue that the exchange 
rate overvaluation is an endogenous variable given that it responds to the evolution of 
productivity. Thus, in this econometric exercise, I use lagged variables as “instrumental” 
proxies for controlling endogeneity in the exchange rate and other potentially endogenous 
variables.  
Following the econometric implementation of Fuentes et. al (2006) the 
determinants TFP are estimated as follows:  
 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝐹𝑃), = Ω(𝐿)𝑋, + Θ(𝐿)𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝐹𝑃), + 𝜖, (11) 
 
where 𝐿 is a lag operator, Ω(𝐿) and Θ(𝐿) are lag polynomials, and 𝑋 is the vector of 
explanatory variables. Based on Hendry (1995), the estimation strategy of Equation 11 
follows the general-to-particular approach.  
Table 3 shows the estimation results. First, the large and significant coefficient of 
the lag of TFP, suggests that productivity exhibits significant degree of inertia. Second, 
the effects of cyclical variables—particularly those of the terms of trade—are highly 
significant across all the specifications. Furthermore, it is interesting that the terms of 
trade variable has both a positive contemporaneous effect and a negative lagged effect. 
This result seems puzzling, but one plausible explanation is that in Bolivia there recurrent 
examples of rent seeking behavior when additional export rents accrue to the central 
government. When an an increasing number of interest groups continuously lobby and 
attempt to capture the newly generated rents from an export boom, the economy suffers 
reductions in aggregate efficiency and productivity (Laserna, 2004).   
The policy variables also show their expected sign, however, the debt variable is 
not significant. To explain this result, Morales and Sachs (1988) suggest that the negative 
effect of debt on the economy was captured by its monetization and the inflation pressure 
it generated. Finally, in spite of their reduced variability, both institutional indicators are 
positive and significant. This result supports the notion that civil liberties and democracy 
are important to improve aggregate productivity, at least in the Bolivian case.  
 
Table 3. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Determinants 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Ln(TFP) with ks=0.32 Ln(TFP) with ks=0.68 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cyclical Variables        
Terms of Trade   0.1060***  0.1060***  0.1143***  0.1251**  0.1259**  0.1342**  
 (0.0335)  (0.0333)  (0.0356)  (0.0582)  (0.0595)  (0.0619)  
Terms of Trade (t-1)  -0.1072**  -0.1068**  -0.1059**  -0.1433**  -0.1408**  -0.1420**  
 (0.0447)  (0.0453)  (0.0436)  (0.0657)  (0.0671)  (0.0679)  
REER overvaluation  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0003*  -0.0002*  -0.0002*  
 (0.0004)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0004)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
REER overvaluation (t-1)  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002  
 (0.0003)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0004)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  
Policies        
Macro.Instability (t-1)  -0.0522*  -0.0532**  -0.0515***  -0.0379  -0.0430*  -0.0433*  
 (0.0285)  (0.0195)  (0.0175)  (0.0300)  (0.0234)  (0.0228)  
Government Debt   -0.00002    -0.00009    
 (0.0003)    (0.0004)    
Institutions         
Civil liberties (t-2)  0.0403***  0.0400***  0.0433*  0.0406*   
 (0.0131)  (0.0120)   (0.0207)  (0.0148)   
Democracy (t-2)    0.0250***   0.0216***  
   (0.0056)    (0.0074)  
Initial Conditions        
TFP (t-1)  0.7922***  0.7965***  0.7852***  0.7968**  0.8118***  0.7943***  
 (0.0766)  (0.0575)  (0.0603)  (0.0948)  (0.0613)  (0.0664)  
Constant  0.8121**  0.7918**  0.9007***  0.7906*  0.7245**  0.8809***  
 (0.3734)  (0.2856)  (0.2811)  (0.4202)  (0.2851)  (0.2972)  
Adjusted R squared  0.9493  0.9519  0.9590  0.9413  0.9437  0.9456  
SER  0.0054  0.0054  0.0046  0.0092  0.0093  0.0090  
 
Note: *** means statistical significance at1%; ** means statistical significance at 5%; and * means 
statistical significance at 10%. 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Marquetti (2011), Heston and Aten (2011), The World Bank 
(2011), and The Freedom House (2011) .  
4. Concluding Remarks 
Bolivia has suffered from a series of investment constraints and negative 
productivity cycles in the last half century. Investment is the engine of capital 
accumulation, but the Bolivian case shows that military cups, inflation problems, and 
uncertainty tend to generate large volatility in the growth rate of investment. Volatile 
investment, however, is not the only source of low capital accumulation. This article also 
emphasized two additional sources: high adjustment costs and low marginal product of 
capital. As discussed in the literature, high adjustment costs of investment tend to reflect 
a weak institutional environment. Particularly for the case of Bolivia, these institutional 
frictions include heavy bureaucracy and corruption (Mendieta and Martin, 2008 ). Based 
on analytical approach and empirical evidence of Caselli and Feyrer (2007), Bolivia’s 
low marginal product of capital can be explained in terms of the low share of reproducible 
capital, high relative price of capital with respect to output, and—following Lucas 
(1990) ’s argument—low stocks of complementary inputs such human capital and 
productivity.  
The evidence on the determinants of total factor productivity (TFP) suggests that 
not only cyclical variables (i.e., terms of trade and real exchange rate fluctuations) help 
explain the behavior of TFP, but also more structural variables such as macroeconomic 
policy and institutions. Besides a significant level of inertia, the positive cycles of TFP 
are associated with efficiency gains that arise from low and stable inflation, low 
government debt, and more participatory institutions (i.e., civil rights and democracy). It 
is worth highlighting that particularly in the last years of the sample (the 2003-2008 
period), noticeable improvements in the terms of trade of the country tend to dominate 
the behavior of TFP. Although macroeconomic stability and democracy may have been 
attained, to achieve a more sustainable growth path in productivity, Bolivia needs to 
reduce the downside risks of its terms of trade.  
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